Abstract:
Password-based key exchange schemes are designed to provide entities communicating
over a public network, and sharing a (short) password only, with a session
key (e.g, the key is used for data integrity and/or confidentiality).
The focus of the present paper is on the analysis of very efficient schemes
that have been proposed to the IEEE P1363 Standard working group on password-based
authenticated key-exchange methods, but which actual security was an open
problem. We analyze the AuthA key exchange scheme and give a complete proof
of its security. Our analysis shows that the AuthA protocol and its multiple
modes of operations are provably secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman
intractability assumption, in both the random-oracle and the ideal-ciphers
models.
Keywords:
Reference:
Proceedings of 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
October 27-30, Washington, DC, USA, 2003, pp ??.
Full paper: PostScript, Compressed PostScript. PDF, Compressed PDF.
Presentation: PDF.
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